This paper assumes that the grants to the political parties are given by the rent-seekers, and the political parties are obliged to distribute rents to those rent-seekers in return whenever they come to the power. But the political parties, in order to be re-elected, cannot easily raise the taxes. And soon rising budget defıcits take place. These budget defıcits can be filled by foreign and domestic borrowings, which again constitute fiscal rents for the rent-seekers. An analysis of political parties' revenues gives a clue of rent seeking activity, but to prove a true relationship between rent seeking and the political rents distributed is almost impossible with the existing data. So, this paper can only imply, rather than prove the relationship between the rent-seekers and the political parties.
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